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  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 
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We propose a path dependence approach to analyze the evolution of the financial 
supervisory architecture, focusing on the institutional role of the central bank, and 
then apply our framework to describe the institutional settings in a selected sample of 
countries. The policymaker who decides to maintain or reform the supervisory   
architecture is influenced by the existing institutional setting in a systematic way: the 
more the central bank is actually involved in supervision, the less likely a more 
concentrated supervisory regime will emerge, and vice versa (path dependence 
effect). We test the path dependence effect describing and evaluating the evolution 
and the present state of the architecture of six national supervisory regimes in South 
Eastern Europe (SEE): Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Serbia and Turkey.   The 
study of the SEE countries confirms the postulated role of the central bank in the 
institutional setting.  In five cases the high involvement of the central bank in 
supervision is correlated with a multi–authority regime, while in one case a high 
degree of financial supervision unification is related with low central bank 
involvement.  
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1. Introduction  
Over the last years the financial supervision landscape has been radically 
transformed. Many countries have made deep reforms of the architecture of financial 
supervision, and more are contemplating changes. In the last twenty years (1986-
2006) 94% of the countries included in a large and heterogeneous sample of 91 
nations chose to reform their financial supervisory setting (Figure 1, Appendix).  
The restructuring wave is making the supervisory regimes less uniform than in the 
past. In several cases the architecture still reflects the classic structure, with separate 
agencies for banking, securities and insurance supervision. However, an increasing 
number of countries show a trend towards a certain degree of consolidation of the 
supervisory responsibilities, which in several cases has resulted in the establishment 
of unified regulators that are different from the national central banks.
1   
The descriptive analysis (Masciandaro 2004) signalled an intriguing result: the 
national choices on how many agencies should be involved in supervision seem to be 
strictly correlated with the existing institutional position of the central bank. The 
degree of supervisory unification seems to be inversely related with the central bank’s 
involvement in supervision. The trade-off – and the related, so called central bank 
fragmentation effect  -  was confirmed first using a cross-country  analysis  of  the 
reforms in the supervisory regimes (Masciandaro 2006) and then by going more 
deeply into the economics of the central bank fragmentation  effect (Masciandaro 
2007 and 2008, Masciandaro and Quintyn 2008,  Dalla Pellegrina and Masciandaro 
2008).   
From a political economy point of view, the central bank fragmentation effect can 
be explained as a peculiar case of path dependence effect (PDE): the incumbent 
policymaker, in choosing the level of financial supervision consolidation, is 
influenced by the characteristics that already exist in terms of the central bank 
position. The policymaker’s choices are viewed as a sequential process in which the 
institutional position of the central bank matters.  
Notwithstanding the evidence, different questions remain still unanswered. Among 
others: Is the PDE able to explain the features of the financial supervisory regimes in 
                                                 
1  For a survey see, e.g.  De Luna Martinez (2003), Masciandaro (2005), and Cihak and Podpiera 
(2007b). The legal issues are described in Mwenda (2006).   8
a narrow and well defined set of countries? Can the same methodology be a useful 
instrument to shed light on specific case studies?  
The aim of this paper is to test the PDE in describing the current features of the 
supervisory regime in six countries of South East Europe (SEE).  The paper is 
organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical setup. In Section 3, we review 
the institutional and empirical background. Section 4 describes the supervisory 
architectures in the six countries of South Eastern Europe. Section 5 applies the 
architecture indicators to test the robustness of the PDE in the SEE sample, providing 
also a comparison between their actual regimes with the supervisory setting 
implemented in the other European countries.  Section 6 will put forward some 
conclusions as well as possible directions for future research.  
 
2. Theoretical Background: Explaining the Path Dependence Effect  
Our theoretical framework is based on three hypotheses. First of all, gains and 
losses of a supervisory regime are variables computed by the incumbent policymaker, 
who maintains or reforms the supervisory regime, following his preferences. 
Secondly, the policymakers are politicians: politicians are held accountable at the 
elections for how they have pleased the voters. All politicians are career oriented 
agents, motivated by the goal of pleasing the voters in order to win the elections. The 
main difference among the various types of politicians concerns which voters they 
wish to please in the first place. Thirdly, the policymakers are influenced by the 
institutional setting in which they operate. 
The relationship among the political choices on the future of the supervisory 
architecture and the actual institutional position of the central bank can be highlighted 
using a simple model (Masciandaro 2008), which applied a general framework of 
political choices (Alesina and Tabellini 2003). Consider a society that wishes to 
assign to an elected policymaker the task of designing the optimal shape of the 
financial supervisory architecture, focusing on the level of consolidation of the 
institutional regime that guarantees the effectiveness of the financial supervision 
policy (thereafter the effective level of unification). The effective level y  of 
unification is determined by the policymaker’s effort a and by his ability: 
   9
y = a + Ω                                         (1) 
 
Ability is a random variable; for the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that Ω
 can 
assume two values only. The policymaker can be outstanding or not. Therefore, the 
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Our aim is to show that taking into account the social preferences is not sufficient 
to explain the shape of the supervisory regime if the incumbent policymaker is career 
concerned. Therefore let us assume that the citizens care about the effectiveness of the 
supervisory regime according to a classic well-behaved concave function u = U (y): 
the social welfare increases with the level of unification. Linear preferences are used:  
 
U(y) = y                                             (2) 
 
The policymaker will take the decision to reform or not the supervisory setting, 
taking into consideration his own personal objective function. The policymaker’s 
effort is costly, and the convex and increasing cost function is defined as C = c (a). 
The reward for the policymaker is labelled R (a) . The two functions are traditionally 
well – behaved. The policymaker’s utility function is defined as:  
 
R (a) – c (a)                                            (3) 
 
Now we can introduce the role of the institutional position of the central bank. Let 
us assume that the costs of implementing a higher level of financial supervision 
concentration can depend on the existing institutional position of the central bank. If a 
high level of central bank involvement in supervision is the status quo,  under specific 
conditions unified supervision is more difficult to implement, and this means that the 
politician’s task is, ceteris paribus, more costly.  
In order to identify these conditions, let us consider that a policymaker aiming to 
consolidate supervision faces two alternative paths: to create a central bank,   10
monopolist in supervision; or to establish a single financial authority, different from 
the central bank. 
The creation of a monopolist central bank can produce information gains, but can 
be costly for different reasons. First of all, the policymaker may dislike the 
implementation of a monopolistic central bank if  the consequent  extension of  the 
classic  moral hazard risks -   which can occur when  monetary policy and supervision 
policy  are delegated  to the central bank – are high (Goodhart and Schoenmaker 
1995, Llewellyn 2005) (moral hazard risk).   
Secondly, implementing a monopolistic central bank regime can also be costly 
when the policymaker delegates also the conduct of business controls to the central 
bank, an area in which central banks have traditionally sought to not be involved. 
Instead they prefer to focus more on stability issues (Goodhart 2007 and Bini Smaghi 
2007) (conflict of interest risk).  Thirdly, the policymaker has to take into account 
the risks of increasing the bureaucratic powers of the central bank (bureaucracy 
risk). Table 1 documents possible country cases where the political wish to avoid 
excessive concentration of bureaucratic power can explain the recent evolution of the 
supervisory setting. In the perception of the helping hand (HH) policymaker the 
overall evaluation of the bureaucracy risk can take into account different factors. For 
example, the risk that the central bank, given its bureaucratic power, should please the 
banking and financial industry (captured central bank), or the possibility that the 
central bank abuses its degree of institutional independence. 
But also the alternative solution – establishing a unified supervisor outside the 
central bank - can face difficulties caused by the central bank position. In fact, the 
policymaker may face costs in establishing a single financial authority—and thus 
reducing the central bank’s involvement in supervision—if the central bank’s 
reputation is high (reputation risk). At the same time, however, if the reputation of 
the central bank is low, or decreasing, the establishment of a single financial authority 
is more likely to occur. The role of reputation can work in both directions. Historical 
cases are described in Table 1.  
Therefore, we identified four different potential reasons to explain what we called 
the PDE:  the more the central banker is involved in supervision, the less likely a 
unified supervisor will be established. Whatever the effort of the policymaker will be,   11
the central bank involvement in supervision can increase the costs in implementing 
financial supervision unification. But under which conditions does the PDE become 
relevant in explaining the policymaker’s decisions on the shape of the supervisory 
architecture?  
The sequence of events is as follows. Society chooses to delegate to the 
policymaker the task of designing the level of supervisory unification. Next, the 
policymaker decides to maintain or to reform the supervisory regime, choosing effort 
a, before knowing his ability Ω in implementing this particular policy task. Finally, 
nature chooses Ω, outcomes are observed and the reward is paid.  
The incumbent policymaker wishes to be re-elected. Now we can take into 
account the possibility that two different types of policymakers exist (Masciandaro 
and Quintyn 2008). On the one hand, one can adopt a helping hand (HH) view (Pigou 
1938)  of the policymaker: he is motivated to improve general welfare. The HH 
policymaker chooses to maintain or reform his country’s supervisory structure in an 
attempt to improve the efficiency of overall resource allocation. From the 
policymaker’s point of view,  implementing this task is convenient if  his re-election 
is more likely to occur if the citizens’ utility exceeds a threshold W. Denoting by β the 
value of office and by  1 a  the effort, the reward function  – given (1) and (2) -  for the 
HH policymaker is: 
 
() ( ) W U a R ≥ = Pr 1 β    
() ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 Pr Pr a W W a a R − ≥ Ω = ≥ Ω + = β β .  
 
()β ≤ ≤ 1 0 a R . 
 
Given the citizens’ threshold, we consider here the more general case
2, when every 
policymaker – outstanding or not - can be potentially able to extract benefits fulfilling 
the mandate of reforming supervision:  
 
1 a W L − ≥ Ω ; then,   1 a W L H − ≥ Ω > Ω  and therefore  ( ) 1 Pr 1 = − ≥ Ω a W  and   ()β = 1 a R .  
 
                                                 
2 See, Masciandaro (2008) for a general discussion.    12
Voters are rational. They realise that the alternative to re-electing the incumbent is to 
get another politician with average ability.  It follows that: 
 
AV





= Ω  
Where 
e a  are the voters’ expectations. The HH policymaker chooses effort before 
observing his talent in implementing the supervisory regime reform, taking the 
expectations as given. The utility function of the politician is:  
 
() () () 1 1 1 1 2
Pr a c a a a c a R
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where ) ( 1 a a L Ω = + Ω  -  given the expectations 
e a  and the skills of the 
policymaker  H Land Ω Ω  - can be considered the re-election condition (Figure 1, 
second graph). The re-election condition depends on the policymaker’s effort only. 
Which is the optimal effort? Given the re-election condition, and the value of the 
officeβ , the policymaker will decide if and how implement the supervisory reform – 
i.e. the optimal effort level 
*
1 a - taking into account the marginal cost of 
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Figure 1: The HH policymaker decision on the optimal level of effort in 
implementing the supervisory reform  
 
 
It is evident (Figure 1) that the interest of the HH policymaker in implementing a 
greater level of supervisory consolidation will depend, ceteris paribus, on the cost 
level. In particular, if the PDE holds, for any level of effort,  the more the central bank 
is involved in supervision, the greater the shift up of the costs level will be, and 
1 a  
β, 
) ( 1




1 a    14
consequently the  smaller the likelihood of a supervision consolidation (the optimal 
level of effort becomes progressively smaller). If the welfare costs become greater 
than the value of the office, for the HH policymaker it is not convenient at all to use 
the supervisory reform to increase his probability of re-election ( 0
*
1 = a ). The citizens 
will not appreciate a supervisory reform whose social losses are greater than the social 
benefits. The status quo - low consolidation in supervision with high involvement of 
the central bank - will be confirmed. Obviously, if the HH policymaker evaluated that 
the increasing involvement of the central bank in the supervision does not imply 
greater costs – i.e. the risks of moral hazard, bureaucratic excessive power, conflict of 
interests, reputational losses are negligible, while the information gains in having the 
central bank deeply involved in supervision are potentially high  – the reform will be 
more likely to occur, producing an “inverse” PDE: the high involvement of the central 
bank in the supervision will be consistent with high level of supervisory 
consolidation. 
Returning to the features of the policymaker, we can use alternatively a grabbing 
hand (GH) view of the political process (Shleifer and Vishny 1988). According to the 
GH approach, the policymakers are motivated by the aim to please the interest of 
specific, well-defined voters. In our case, the financial industry may be considered a 
highly organised and powerful interest group. The GH policymaker, in defining the 
supervisory setting, depends on the market view of supervision, if this univocally 
determines his re-election.  
The preferences of the financial constituency can be written as: 
 
() f y V − + = 2 1 δ  
 
The parameter δ represents the importance of the supervisory consolidation goal 
for the financial constituency. Using δ we can study explicitly the possibility that the 
central bank should be a captured institution. In fact if we consider the existence of a 
financial lobby, we have to take into account the possibility that also the central bank 
should please the financial constituency. If the central is a captured agency, δ is 
equivalent to the degree of central bank involvement in supervision: the more the 
central bank is involved in supervision, the greater the financial constituency’s   15
interest in implementing a more consolidated supervision ( 0 ≥ δ ). Alternatively, if the 
central bank is an independent agency, the more the central banker is involved in 
supervision, the smaller the financial industry’s preference toward more consolidation 
in supervision ( 0 ≤ δ ), in order to avoid the risk of giving more power to a not-
captured central bank. 
The parameter f  represents the campaign contributions; their purpose is to 
determine the incumbent’s chances of winning the elections. Let us assume that the 
policymaker’s effort devoted to implementing the supervisory regime is observable by 
the financial constituency; the financial professionals can be considered insider agents 
with respect to the other citizens. Therefore the campaign contributions can be 
contingent upon the policymaker’s effort: f(a2); for simplicity  f = ka2.  The GH 
policymaker chooses effort, taking into account the lobby goal function, as well as the 
usual social potential costs of implementing the reform, linked to the central bank’s 
involvement in supervision.  The utility function of the GH policymaker is:  
 
() [] [ ] 2 2 2 2 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ka a f y V y R − Ω + + = − + = = δ β δ β β  
 
() () 2 2 a C y R −  =  [ ] ) ( ) )( 1 ( 2 2 2 a c ka a − − Ω + +δ β  
 
() ()0 2 2 > − a C y R  
 
[] ) )( ( ) )( 1 ( 2 2 a c k a + > Ω + + β δ β  
 
Other things being equal, the level of revenues  ) ( 2 y R and the level of costs 
) ( 2 a C of the GH policymaker depend both on the effort  2 a in implementing the 
supervisory reform (Figure 2). In equilibrium the optimal effort 
*
2 a   will equate 
marginally costs and benefits (provided that  ) ( ) 1 ( c k + < + β δ β ):    16
 
 
Figure 2: The GH policymaker decision on the optimal level of effort in 
implementing the supervisory reform  
 
 
The interest of the GH policymaker in implementing a greater level of supervisory 
consolidation will depend, ceteris paribus, on how captured the central bank is  – i.e. 
effect on δ of the central bank involvement in supervision – and notwithstanding the 
costs in increasing the  consolidation – i.e. effect on c of the central bank involvement 
in supervision. If the central banker is captured (δ>0), it is more likely that the 
financial constituency likes the supervisory consolidation and the reform will be 
implemented: the costs level will determine the optimal level of effort 
*
2 a  of the GH 
policymaker.  Under these conditions a central bank unification effect is more likely 
to occur: we will have the “inverse” PDE: the more the central banker is involved in 
supervision, the more likely a unified supervisor will be. Otherwise, the more the 
central bank is independent from the financial constituency (d<0) the smaller the 
policymaker’s effort in implementing the supervisory reform and a supervisor 
different from the central bank is more likely to be established. If the central bank is a 
strong, independent one (d<-1), the GH policymaker (
*
2 a  =0) will prefer the status  
2 a  
) ( ), ( 2 2 a C a R  
*
2 a    17
quo - low consolidation in supervision with high involvement of the central bank - 
and we will have again our PDE. 
Let us summarise the main findings. If the policymaker acts as an HH type the 
central bank involvement in supervision can be viewed an obstacle in the supervision 
consolidation if at least one of four reasons – moral hazard, conflict of interest, 
bureaucracy power and reputational losses – is present. The PDE is likely to occur. If 
the policymaker chooses to please the financial community acting as a GH type, the 
PDE is less likely to occur, provided that the financial community likes a more 
consolidated supervision, and the central bank is a captured one.   If and only if these 
assumptions hold we can disentangle the effect of different types of policymakers 
over the relationship between the financial supervision unification and the central 
bank involvement. Otherwise a signal extraction problem occurs. For example, other 
things being equal, if the central bank is not a captured one and the policymaker acts 
as a GH type, the PDE is more likely to occur again. 
 
3.  Institutional and Empirical Background: Measuring and Testing 
the Path Dependence Effect 
Our theoretical framework predicts the possibility of different degrees of 
unification in the design of the supervisory structure, depending on the type of the 
policymaker involved, and on the features of the parameters of the model; in 
particular our attention has been focused on the institutional role of the central bank in 
supervision, in order to shed light on the PDE.  
In the real world, the type of the policymaker – as well as all the structural and 
institutional channels which influence his behaviour – is a hidden variable. At each 
point in time, we can only observe the politicians’ decision to maintain or reform the 
supervisory structure, in particular its level of unification. Therefore the next step is to 
measure the degree of unification in the actual supervisory regimes, as well as the 
central bank involvement, which represents our key explanatory variable.   
How can the degree of unification of financial supervision be measured? This is 
where the financial supervision unification index (FSU Index) proposed in 
Masciandaro (2004) and used in Masciandaro (2007 and 2008) comes in (description   18
in Table 2). This index was created through an analysis of which and how many 
authorities in the 91 countries examined are empowered to supervise the three 
traditional sectors of financial activity: banking, securities markets and insurance.
3 
The country sample depends on the availability of institutional data.
4 
To transform the qualitative information into quantitative indicators, a numerical 
value to each type of regime has been assigned, in order to highlight the number of the 
agencies involved. The rationale by which the values have been assigned simply 
considers the concept of unification of supervisory powers: the greater the unification, 
the higher the index value.
5 
Figure 2 (Appendix) shows the distribution of the FSU Index. On the one hand 
there are countries (40) with a low consolidation of supervision (the Index is equal to 
0 or 1). On the other, there are countries (15) that established a unified supervisor, 
with a high level of supervision consolidation. 
Now we will consider what role the central bank plays in the various national 
supervisory regimes. We use the index of the central bank's involvement in financial 
supervision: the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA) (description in 
Table 2). Figure 3 (Appendix) shows the distribution of the CBFA Index. In the 
majority of countries in our sample (39) the central bank is the main bank supervisor 
(the Index is equal to 2), while in very few countries (2) the central bank is 
monopolistic in the overall financial supervision (the Index is equal to 4).  
It is interesting to note that, in general, the present degree of the central bank 
involvement has been established in the previous years, and then confirmed in 
subsequent reforms; this observation is consistent with our path dependence approach. 
In fact, for each country we compare the year in which the present degree of central 
bank involvement in supervision was established (i.e. definition of the CBFA Index, 
blue line), with the year of the most recent reform of the supervisory architecture (i.e. 
definition of the FSU Index, red line) (Figure 4, Appendix). Given the data of 88 
national reforms of the supervisory architecture (see Figure 1, Appendix) , the central 
                                                 
3  Sources: for all countries, official documents and websites of the central banks and the other financial 
authorities. The information is updated to 2006. See Table 2. 
4 In the empirical analysis we do not include the very small countries and territories (Bahrain, 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong Maldives, Netherlands Antilles, Singapore and 
United Arab Emirates) with a single financial authority so as to avoid an evident bias in the empirical 
analysis.  
5 For more information see, Masciandaro (2004 and 2008).    19
bank involvement was confirmed in 67 cases (76%), decreased in 16 cases (18%), 
increased in 5 cases (6%). 
Now, considering both indexes for the countries in our sample (Figure 5, 
Appendix), the analysis shows that the two most frequently appearing regimes are the 
extremes: on the one hand, Unified Supervisory regime (13 cases, red ball); on the 
other, Central Bank Dominated Multiple Supervisors regime (27 cases, white ball). 
The Figure seems to depict a trade off between supervision unification and central 
bank involvement, with two outliers (green ball). 
Finally, it is possible to empirically investigate the robustness of the PDE 
(Masciandaro 2007 and 2008, Masciandaro and Quintyn 2008, Dalla Pellegrina and 
Masciandaro 2008). Following our theoretical setup, each policymaker – either the 
HH type or the GH type - maximises his objective function and determines his 
optimal level of supervision unification, given the features of the structural variables. 
The result that emerges is a significant inverse relationship between the supervision 
unification and central bank involvement. So far, the PDE matters.  
 
4. Supervisory Architectures and Central Bank Role in SEE 
Countries 
The precedent sections pointed out that the existing institutional role of the central 
bank – i.e. the status quo – can explain the future evolution of the supervisory 
architecture. Both the theoretical model and the econometric analysis claim the 
robustness of the PDE. Now we wonder if the path dependence approach can be 
useful in exploring the features of the supervisory architectures in a selected sample of 
countries. It might be interesting to ask if the PDE is evident in the six SEE countries. 
Finding a response would help us not only to interpret what has happened in the past 
but also to project scenarios of change for the future, with a particular focus on 
prospects within the European Union framework. 
In order to analyse the supervisory architecture, we first describe the six 
supervisory regimes.  
 
   20
4.1 Albania  
During the last fifteen years, Albanian financial services have undergone major 
changes in the process of transition from a centralized economy started at the 
beginning of 1990s. Albania inherited an underdeveloped financial sector from the 
communist regime. The weakness of financial institutions was the major factor 
responsible for the development of pyramid schemes. The collapse of these schemes 
dragged the Albanian financial system into a crisis in 1997. The Government tried to 
face the crisis by issuing new sets of rules and regulations. As part of the IMF-
supported emergency program, a new banking law was approved in July 1998 
establishing a two-tier banking system, in which the Bank of Albania (BoA) was 
given the role of supervisor of the banking system. Amendments to the banking law 
further strengthened the role of the BoA and the financial system. Besides the BoA, 
there is also the Albania Securities Commission and the Insurance Supervisory 
Authority (Table 3).  
Bank of Albania 
First instituted in 1913, the central bank did not survive during the First World 
War. The period between 1925 and 1944 was characterized by the attempts to 
establish a National Bank of Albania and then, during the period 1944-1992, by the 
settlement of the State Bank of Albania with both the function of a central bank and a 
commercial one. Finally with Law No. 7559 ‘On the Bank of Albania’ of 1998 a two-
tier system was created with the Bank of Albania performing the function of a central 
bank. Moreover, the law gives the BoA the function of supervisor of the banking 
system. According to the above mentioned law, the Banking and Supervision 
Department was created to perform supervision function and prepare the regulatory 
framework of the Bank of Albania. New regulations were, in fact, drafted during the 
succeeding years by the Supervision Department, also to integrate into Albanian 
banking legislation the provisions of the Basel Committee Principles. The year 1998 
can be considered as the year when further steps in the area of financial supervision 
were taken, starting from the amendment to the regulation “On the Bank of Albania” 
(law no. 8269/1997) and regulation on “On banks in the Republic of Albania” (law 
no. 8365/1998) which stipulates that the Bank of Albania is the sole authority to issue 
licenses and to regulate and supervise all the banks in the Republic of Albania. These   21
amendments were made urgent by the fact that the banking system in Albania was 
gradually changing and by the crisis in 1997.  
Following the provisions contained in the ‘On the Bank of Albania’ law as 
amended in 1997, the BoA is an entirely independent institution, accountable to the 
Albanian Parliament (People’s Assembly) and responsible for the implementation of 
the monetary policy and of the supervision of the banking system. As stated in the art 
41 of the statute of the BoA, the management of the Bank is represented by the 
Supervisory Council, consisting of a Governor and of two Deputy governors. The 
Supervision Department refers to the First Deputy Governor.  
The president of the Republic of Albania appoints the Governor of the Bank, at the 
Prime Minister’s proposal. The Minister of Finance has the right to attend meetings of 
the Supervisory Council of the BoA, even though he is not entitled to vote.  
Banking legislation received a recent contribution by the Law ‘On Banks of the 
Republic of Albania’, No. 9662/2006 which contains in its Chapter VI detailed 
provisions about the process of issuing and revoking licenses by the Bank of Albania.   
If the Commission – see below - is the supervisory authority for issue licenses into 
the securities market, the Bank of Albania has the authority to establish a securities 
market. Moreover, the Bank established also a Supervisory Board for the Stock 
Market in order to supervise the activity of the stock exchange and to change its 
regulations. The BoA may, in fact, issue directives and also demand for amendments 
to the regulations of the securities market. 
Albanian Securities Commission 
It has been initially established by Law 8080/1996 as an independent authority and 
its main aim is to regulate and supervise the securities market. It is composed of five 
members that are proposed by the President and appointed for five years. The main 
function of the Commission is to issue licenses for securities’ traders and supervise 
the management and the operation of all the licensed companies. According to the 
recent IMF FSAP report (2005), the securities market is at a very early stage of 
development, with little market activity.  Fees for licensing, approvals and all other 
activities should be the main funding sources to operate financially independently. 
The Commission is in fact still dependent form funding from the Government, 
because of the low level of activity in the market.    22
Insurance Supervisory Authority 
The legal framework regulating the supervision of the insurance sector is 
contained in Law 7506/1991 and Law 8081/1996.The ISC mainly concentrates on the 
supervision of the financial status of insurance companies. Operating in the insurance 
sector is subject to the approval by the ISC, which also issues decision and regulations 
relevant for the operation of insurance companies.  
 
4.2 Bulgaria  
In Bulgaria two financial supervisory authorities can be identified (Table 4): the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the Financial Supervision Commission (FSC). 
Bulgarian National Bank 
The BNB was established in 1879 even though it acquired the status of central 
bank only with the Law on the Establishment of the Bank in 1985. Since then, the 
legal framework has further defined and extended the competencies of the BNB. In 
the 1926, after a period of crisis during which the Bank operated under the direction 
of the Ministry of Finance, the BNB, according to a new BNB Law, gained the status 
of a real central bank. It was also the first time that the regulatory power of the Bank 
over the banking system was strengthened together with its independence, especially 
with respect to decision of government lending. The period between 1947 and 1989 
was the time when a state monopoly of banking was established by the Communist 
Party and BNB lost most of its independence. After 1980 a two-tier banking system 
was created with BNB playing the role of a central bank issuing institution. At the 
beginning of 1990s, BNB regained part of its lost independence: in 1992 a new Law 
on Banks and Lending restored the existence of central banking and commercial 
banking. The year 1997 represents an important year for the general reorganization of 
the functions and status of the BNB. The new BNB Law reorganised the monetary 
system creating a Currency Board Arrangement and three new departments: the Issue, 
the Banking and the Banking Supervision Department. Successive amendments to the 
Law of BNB, for example in 2005 and 2006, strengthened the financial and 
institutional independence of the BNB and its duties in the design of monetary policy 
and the stability of the financial sector. Specific supervisory provisions of the BNB on 
the banking system are contained in the Law on Credit Institutions, recently approved   23
by the Bulgarian Parliament (July 2006 and amended in 2007). As stated in art.1 ch.I, 
this law contains terms and procedures for granting licenses and conducting activities 
and supervising credit institutions in Bulgaria. BNB is the only financial authority that 
can grant and revoke licenses to banks.
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In operating its supervisory role, the BNB is independent (art 44, ch.7 of the Law 
on the BNB) and accountable to the National Assembly to which it has to present an 
annual report. The managing board is constituted by a Governing Council, a Governor 
and three Deputy Governors. The Governors are elected by the National Assembly, 
which elects also the Deputy Governors. The other three members of the Governing 
Council are appointed by the President of the Republic.  
Financial Supervision Commission 
The FSC was created in 2003 through the merger of the former Insurance 
Supervisory Agency, the State Insurance Supervision Agency and the National 
Securities Agency, which became Departments of the new FSC (FSC Act, 
promulgated in January 2003, art.10). The FSC is now the only financial supervisory 
authority for the security and the insurance sector. It is an independent authority 
accountable to Parliament and it is composed by seven members, the Chairman, the 
Deputy Chairmen and the other Commissioners, all elected by the National Assembly.   
 
4.3 Greece  
The legal framework regulating the financial sector in Greece is fragmented in 
different codes, laws and regulations because there has not been a systematic 
codification of all the laws. In particular, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has 
issued Ministerial Decisions to regulate specific issues related to the financial sector 
while the Ministry of Development has regulated the private insurance sector. The 
three authorities of financial supervision are the Bank of Greece (BoG) for the 
banking sector, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) for the capital 
market and the Financial Supervisory Committee for Private Insurance (Table 5). 
 
                                                 
6 However, Article 14 of the law also stipulates that the BNB shall first consider the written statement 
of the Financial Supervision Commission before licensing a bank.   24
Bank of Greece 
As stated in the Art. 2 of its statute, it is the supervisory body for all the banks and 
credit institutions operating in Greece. It was founded in 1927 and started its 
operation in 1928. The legal framework for the operation of the BoG is represented by 
its statute first ratified by Law 3424/1927 and amended several times. The statute 
does not state explicitly that the BoG is an independent institution but only that BoG 
should not take instruction form the government or any organization and that the 
government or any other political authority should not try to influence the operations 
of the BoG. The General Meetings of Shareholders was given a wide range of powers, 
ranging from the approval of the annual report to the election or removal of members 
of the General Council, and the proposal to amend the Statute (these proposals should 
be submitted to the Parliament through the Government). The Minister of Finance 
may nominate a Government Commissioner with the right to attend the General 
Meeting of the Shareholders without having the right to vote. The General Council is 
entitled to make all the other decisions and powers not specifically reserved to the 
General Meeting. It is composed by the Governor and two Deputy Governors, two 
members of the Monetary Policy Council and six Councillors. The Governor and the 
Deputy Governors are appointed for a 6-year term at the proposal of the Council of 
Minister. The General Council should approve an annual report to be then submitted 
to the Annual General Meeting. Moreover the Annual General Meeting shall elect 3 
Auditors to examine the balance sheet of the bank. The statute also clearly indicates 
the circumstances in which the Governor and other members of the General Council 
may be relieved from their office. The dispositions about prudential supervision of the 
BoG are contained in the Art. 55A of the Statute. The BoG has regulatory and 
supervisory power over all credit institutions, including the right to impose sanctions 
and penalties. 
 The main changes to the legal framework were introduced during the last decade, 
mainly due to the adoption of EU directives. In fact, the pursuit of business by credit 
institutions is mainly governed by Law 2076/1992 which incorporated into Greek 
banking legislation the 2nd Banking Directive (89/646/EEC, as codified by Directive 
2000/12/EC). This law contains dispositions about the procedures for granting and 
withdrawing licenses.    25
The two most important amendments aimed at modernizing the operation of the 
BoG, in line with the provision of the Treaty of the EU. The new Statute explicitly 
states that the Bank’s primary objective is to ensure price stability; safeguards the 
Bank’s independence and establishes its accountability to Parliament; creates a new 
body at the Bank of Greece, the Monetary Policy Council and recognizes the Bank’s 
legal integration into the Euro system.  
Hellenic Capital Market Commission 
The HCMC has been initially created by the Law 148/1967 as a special 
Committee of the Ministry of Economy and Finance without legal personality. It 
obtained legal personality in 1991. In fact, as stated in Law 1969/1991, the HCMC is 
a self-governing institution operating under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
National Economy with the aim of supporting the stability of the capital market and 
supervising the operation of market participants, ensuring the protection of investors 
and the sound operation of the stock market. The amendments contained in Law 
2324/95 introduce a legal framework that establishes the HCMC as an independent 
authority. In accordance with the law 1969/91 and following amendments, in 
particular those contained in Law 2396/96, the CMC can issue regulatory provisions, 
grant and revoke licenses, impose sanctions, enforce the applicable legislation and 
draft the annual budget. It is composed of a seven-member Board of Directors and a 
three-member Executive Committee. The Minister of the National Economy appoints 
the Chairman and the two Vice-Chairmen of the Board for a five-year period. The rest 
four board members are selected by the Minister of the National Economy among the 
candidates proposed by the BoG, the Board of Directors of the Athens Stock 
Exchange, the Union of Institutional Investors and the Federation of Greek Industries. 
The CMC is financed by fees and a contribution paid by the supervised entities and 
receives also funding from the government. The Law also establishes accountability 
arrangements for the HCMC.  
Financial Supervisory Committee for Private Insurance  
Until recently, the Directorate of Insurance Enterprises and Actuaries of the 
Ministry of Development (that was previously under the Minister of Commerce) was 
the competent supervisory authority for the supervision of the insurance sector. It was 
responsible for granting authorization for the establishment and operation of insurance   26
companies as well as for exercising administrative and financial supervision of these 
companies. The Ministry exercised prudential supervision over the solvency and 
accounting of insurance companies, as well as conduct-of business regulation. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Development was responsible for imposing monetary 
sanctions in cases of non-compliance with the legal framework. The supervision of 
insurance is currently in transition. Law 3229/2004 establishes the  Financial 
Supervisory Committee for Private Insurance as authority responsible for the 
regulation and supervision of the insurance sector under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Finance. The new authority will be administered by a nine-member Board 
of Directors composed as follows: the deputy chairman who will be the president of 
the Association of Greek Insurance Companies and representatives of the Consumer 
Protection Directorate, the Hellenic Actuarial Society, a representative of the 
Insurance Brokers Association, as well as representatives of the ministry of finance 
and the ministry of development, two assessors and a representative of the Guarantee 
Fund. The Authority will be funded by contributions from supervised insurance 
companies and the State budget funding.   
Together with this new supervisory authority, a Coordination Board will be 
created consisting of the Director of the Bank of Greece and the Chairmen of the 
Capital Markets Committee and the Insurance Committee The aim of this Board is to 
promote cooperation between the three existing supervisory authorities and to 
formulate proposals for the introduction of supervisory regulations for financial 
institutions and to promote the unification of the three supervisory bodies.  
 
4.4 Romania  
Romanian financial services have undergone a general process of reshaping and 
redefinition in order to meet the EU criteria for accession. This has been accompanied 
by a progressively strengthening of the legal framework for financial operations. 
Romania has three financial supervisory authorities (Table 6): the National Bank of 
Romania (NBR), the National Securities Commission (NSC) and the Insurance 
Supervision Commission (ISC). 
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National Bank of Romania 
The NBR, established in 1880, through its Supervisory Committee is the only 
supervisory authority for the banking system. Between late 1940s and the end of 
1980s, the NBR lost its identity as a central bank because it was reduced to a mere 
financial instrument in the hands of the Government. By the end of the Communist 
era, in 1991, with Law 34/1991 it regained the status and functions of a central bank. 
But we have to wait until 1998 with Law 101/1998 (the Bank’s act) to have a ruling 
status for the NBR which represents the legal framework of the Bank, establishing 
that the NBR has legal identity as central bank, and extends its functioning in the 
directions of monetary policy and prudential supervision. This law has been recently 
replaced by the NBR Act contained in Law 312/28 of June 2004 which clarifies 
primary objectives and tasks of the central bank, from the implementation of the 
monetary policy to the authorisation, regulation and prudential supervision of credit 
institutions. In particular, art 25 of chapter V of the Law recalls also the provision 
contained in Law 58/1998 (the Banking Act), which established that NBR must 
ensure the sound functioning of credit institutions, may issue licenses and regulations, 
norms, orders and circulars, take measures and apply sanctions to those institutions 
that do not respect the criteria promulgated by the central bank. In operating its 
statutory functions, the NBR is managed by a Board of Directors composed of nine 
members appointed by the Parliament for a period of five years. The NBR is 
accountable to the Parliament to which it is obliged to present an annual report.  
National Securities Commission 
The NSC succeeds the Securities Agency established by a government ordinance 
18/1993 as a general department of the Ministry of Public Finance. It has been 
established by Law 52/1994 as the autonomous authority responsible for securities 
and stock exchange market, with legal personality. Its functions in terms of regulation 
and supervision have been strengthened by Law 129/2000 and successively by a new 
law approved in 2002 (the Statute of the NSC, law 514/2002). The NSC is composed 
by seven members appointed by the Parliament, who can be dismissed according to 
the legal provisions. It is accountable to the Parliament to which it has the obligation 
to submit an annual report. Its members may be dismissed by the Parliament only 
according to the conditions expressed by the Statute of the NSC. NSC’s revenues 
come from fees charged to the regulated entities for the supervisory services carries   28
out. The Commission is the only legal authority with powers of licensing, authorizing 
and issuing norms and regulations regarding the supervision in the security market.  
Insurance Supervisory Commission 
As the NSC, also the ISC was created to replace the former authority responsible 
for the insurance market, the Supervisory Office of Insurance and Reinsurance 
Activity of the Ministry of Public Finance. It is an administratively and financially 
autonomous authority set up through Law 32/2000 (the Insurance Regulatory Act). It 
is managed by a Council composed by five members all appointed by Parliament. Its 
organization has been constantly improved and changed: the current one includes 
specialized directorates The ISC represents now the only authority responsible for the 
authorization, supervision and regulation of the insurance sector.  
 
4.5 Serbia  
In Serbia two financial supervisory authorities can be identified (Table 7): the 
National Bank of Serbia (NBS) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The process of reorganization and development of financial supervision in Serbia 
started from the beginning of 1990s with a general transition toward a market 
economy. During the early stages, the financial sector was affected by political 
difficulties in the Balkan area and from the economic downturn caused by the war. 
The end of the war and the successive further development enhanced the necessity to 
provide a legal framework to the changes of the financial system. The recent 
developments witness that the country is indeed constructing a legislative framework 
that a growing financial sector is requiring. New Laws were passed in order to 
organize some sectors, like the securities market, that is still not well established. 
From the point of view of financial supervision and regulation, the country is also 
further developing and refining its framework in response to the emerging needs.  
National Bank of Serbia 
The NBS was established in 1884 with the name of Privileged National Bank of 
the Kingdom of Serbia. Right after the WWII, the Bank was nationalized under the 
name of National Bank of Yugoslavia. In 2003, following the break-up  of   
Yugoslavia after the war, the central bank was named National bank of Serbia, as an 
autonomous and independent institution of the Republic of Serbia. Functions,   29
objectives and the organization of the NBS are governed by the Law on the National 
Bank of Serbia No. 72 of July 2003. It is the institution responsible for the conduct of 
monetary policy and for the supervision and the licensing of the credit institutions. 
The main bodies of the NBS are the Monetary Board, the Governor and the Council. 
Management of the operations of the bank is in the hands of the Governor who is 
appointed by the Parliament for a five-year term. The five members of the Council are 
also appointed by the Parliament. The NBS’ powers concerning the supervision and 
the regulations of the financial sector comprise the issue and withdrawal of licenses 
for bank and credit institutions, the adoptions of rules governing prudential standards 
for banking operations, the supervision of banks’ adherence to prudential standards 
and the provision of regulations governing the licensing process. The Law on the NBS 
further stipulates that in carrying out its responsibilities the central bank acts as an 
autonomous and independent institution. The recent Supplement to the Law on the 
NBS No. 55/2004 extends the supervisory role of the NBS,to the insurance sector 
(issuing of insurance, reinsurance, brokerage licenses) which was previously one of 
the roles of the Ministry of Finance. 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
The SEC is a separate independent legal agency established in 1990 for regulating 
and supervising the securities market in Serbia and to protect investors. It consists of a 
chairman and four other members appointed by the Government. Its function is to 
assure financial discipline in security trading, to issue license for financial exchange 
and supervise the operation of various actors in the financial market. The Commission 
has also regulatory powers In order to carry out its functions the Commission is 
financed through fees from the supervised entities. In case fees do not cover the 
operating costs, the state budget will cover the difference.  
      
4.6 Turkey  
Two financial supervisory authorities operate in Turkey (Table 8): the Banking 
Regulation and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) and the Insurance Supervisory Office 
(ISO).  Turkey started to modernize and liberalize its financial sector in the late 
1980s. During the past two decades, in fact, the Turkish financial system has 
undergone a transformation toward liberalization in term of corporate governance of   30
the participants and in terms of legislative provisions governing the financial services. 
The Turkish economy has been hit by three different crises during the last 15 years 
(1994, 2000 and 2001). The last one has driven the banking and financial sector into a 
severe downturn. The Turkish authorities, recognizing the structural problems of the 
economy, made important changes in order to put it on the right way toward 
development. The most significant program adopted by the Government to restructure 
the economy was the one for the ‘Transition to a Strong Economy’ in 2001 designed 
to help especially the weak banking sector. New regulations were adopted regarding 
internal control, corporate governance and risk management. Some of the objective of 
the recovering program decided by the government is slowly putting the Turkish 
banking and financial system on the right way to development.  
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency  
The BRSA was established in 1999 by the Banks Act No. 4389 art.3 and started its 
operations in 2000 as a legal entity with financial and administrative autonomy. Prior 
to the Bank Act, the Treasury Under secretariat and the Central Bank had been the 
two main regulatory and supervisory bodies in the banking sector. Starting in a period 
when the banking sector, under the threat of a new crisis and in general, in a period 
when the banking system was very vulnerable, the Agency had to face the difficult 
task of restructuring the entire banking system. Among BRSA’s duties are: the 
implementation of banking legislation; monitor and supervise the banking system and 
create a proper environment for banking and financial actors to operate. With the 
creation of the BRSA, the Savings and Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) whose task is 
among others to administrate and supervise banks whose license was withdrawn by 
the BRSA (a Fund that was previously under the authority of the Central Bank), 
started to operate under the administration of the BRSA. With the amendment Act No. 
5020/2003, the management has been separated by the BRSA. The decision-making 
and managing body of the Agency is the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board 
(BRSB), which is appointed by the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and has seven 
members, all appointed by the Council of Ministers. They are appointed for a six-year 
period and cannot be discharged. The BRSA is accountable to the Prime Minister, 
who requires annual accounts of the BRSA to be audited by a committee formed by 
an auditor form the Supreme Court of Public Accounts, an inspector from the Prime 
Minister’s office an one from the Minster of Finance’s office. The supervisory system   31
has recently been further strengthened to bring it closer to international standards of 
the prudential regulation.
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In order to make the Turkish financial market more competitive, a new Banking 
Act (No.5411) was issued at the end of 2005. It contains new provisions in terms of 
supervision by the BRSA related to new companies whose operations go under the 
supervision of the BRSA (such as financial holding companies, leasing, factoring and 
consumer finance companies); activities that banks may engage listed clearly and in 
compatibility with the directives of the EU; the establishment of an audit committee 
with all members chosen from non-executive members of the board of directors, to 
assist board of directors for on-side and off-side supervision activities.  
Insurance Supervisory Office 
The ISO was first established as an auditing board for the supervision of insurance 
companies by the law on the Auditing of Insurance Companies of 1959. It has been 
then created by Law 7397/1963 under the organization of Ministry of Commerce. In 
1994 it was moved to the under secretariat of Treasury. Its main objectives and 
responsibilities are to supervise, audit and investigate the activities of the insurance 
companies. Supervisors of the Office are authorized to control all books, records, 
statements and accounting documents at the premises of insurance and reinsurance 
companies periodically. The supervisory framework is life and non life (general) 
insurance.  
 
5. Evaluating the Supervisory Architectures and Central Bank Role 
in SEE Countries: a Comparative Analysis  
To evaluate the supervisory regimes in the SEE countries we can perform a 
comparative analysis using our institutional indicators on a sample of 30 countries 
(the sum between the SEE countries and the EU countries). Let us consider first the 
degree of unification of financial supervision (Figure 6, Appendix). Five SEE 
countries out of six (except Turkey) reach the minimum level of FSU index, while the 
average level of this index is 4.1. The standard deviation of the SEE countries is 1.51, 
                                                 
7 They cover aspects such as capital adequacy, control and risk management, consolidated and cross-
border supervision of banks, etc.   32
while the overall sample shows a standard deviation equal to 2.71. Therefore the SEE 
countries show a lower and more homogeneous level of concentration.  
Focusing on the degree of central bank involvement in supervision (Figure 7, 
Appendix), Five SEE countries out of six (except Turkey) present a level of CBFA 
greater than 1.75, which is the average level. The standard deviation of the SEE 
countries is 0.75, while the overall sample shows a standard deviation of 0.94. Thus, 
the SEE countries show a higher and more homogeneous level of central bank 
involvement in supervision. 
Finally, each SEE institutional structure can be identified using the two indices 
(Figure 8, Appendix). Considering the overall sample, the analysis confirms  that the 
two most frequent regimes are polarised: on the one hand, Unified Supervisor regime 
(8 cases, red ball); on the other, Central Bank Dominated Multiple Supervisors regime 
(6 cases, white ball). The Figure depicts again the trade off between supervision 
unification and central bank involvement, with one outlier (green ball). The SEE 
countries (yellow stars) are all characterized by Central Bank Dominated Multiple 
Supervisors regimes, with the exception of Turkey. 
The central bank role seems to matter. In the descriptive analysis we can also 
adopt alternative indicators of the central bank role. We use two different proxies of 
the central bank importance: the central bank independence; the central bank age, 
assuming that an old central bank is more influential. Considering central bank 
independence (Figure 9, Appendix), four SEE countries have a degree of central bank 
independence clearly greater than the average level  (0.73), while for  two countries  – 
Serbia and Turkey – the independence is quite close to the average. At the same time, 
the central banks of three SEE countries are relatively old (Figure 10, Appendix).  
Finally, just to add more information, let us remember that in the econometric 
analysis the multi–authority regime is more likely to occur when the political 
governance index is low and when, other things being equal, the country population is 
relative big. All the five SEE countries with multi – authority regimes show low 
political governance performances (Figure 11, Appendix), but also the Turkey ranking 
is in the same category. Considering the population, only one SEE country with 
multi– authority regime (Romania) has a population bigger than the average level 
(Figure 12, Appendix).    33
In conclusion,   the study of the SEE countries seems to confirm the possible role 
of the institutional position of the central bank in influencing the policymaker’s 
choices in reshaping the financial supervision architecture. Given that the type of the 
policymaker is unknown, the story of the PDE goes as follows. Each policymaker, in 
determining the future level of unified supervision, could be influenced by the actual 
involvement of the central bank, but under different conditions. 
If the policymaker is of an HH type, it should care about the effectiveness of the 
supervision, in order to please the citizens. If the policymaker sees the supervision 
consolidation as a welfare improvement, then the central bank involvement could be 
viewed as an obstacle, but only if at least one of the four reasons described above – 
i.e. moral hazard, conflict of interest, bureaucracy and reputation –holds, and the risks 
of welfare costs overcome the potential benefits in terms of informational gains. If the 
policymaker is of a GH type, it wishes to please the financial constituency. In this 
case the PDE effect holds if, and only if, the financial constituency dislikes the unified 
supervision and this condition is more likely to occur if the central bank is an 
independent agency.   
What are the policy implications of our analysis? At the national level our path 
dependency approach can explain both the emerging trend towards the single financial 
authorities, and the (so far few) cases of supervisory consolidation in favour of the 
central banks. Let us consider for example the three European cases in which the 
reforms of the supervision architecture increased – Ireland and the Netherlands – or 
could increase – Italy – the power of the national central bank. Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Italy are members of the Economic and Monetary Union, and their 
central banks no longer have the full responsibility for national monetary policies. 
Therefore we can interpret these reforms as cases in which HH policymakers can 
increase the central bank role in supervision, given that the risks of moral hazard, 
conflict of interest risks, bureaucratic overpower are likely to be low, while the 
information and reputational gains are likely to be high. Alternatively, we can study 
each of these reforms as possible cases of GH policymakers that implement the 
supervision regime favoured by the financial industry. In general, disentangling the 
two interpretations in specific country cases can be a welcome extension of the 
research agenda.    34
At the European level our model says that the establishment of a single financial 
authority is less likely to occur with the presence of a European central bank deeply 
involved in supervision. Conversely, the less the European Central Bank is involved 
in the financial supervision architecture, the more likely the establishment of a 
European Single Financial Authority will be.  
 
6. Conclusions: Research Agenda 
The current worldwide wave of reforms in supervisory architectures leaves the 
interested bystander with a great number of questions regarding the true determinants 
of, and motivations behind, these changes. These questions are all the more justified 
because the emerging institutional structures are certainly not homogeneous across 
countries.  
An answer to these questions requires a political economy approach. Indeed, 
financial supervisory reform is a political process which involves many stakeholders: 
the political class, the central bank, the supervised entities, as well as the customers of 
the financial services. So the all-encompassing question is: which considerations and 
views prevail in the end in the decision making process, and to what extent are the 
decision-makers taking into account the views of these different classes of 
stakeholders when deciding on a reform of the supervisory structures. 
This paper tries to offer more analysis on these questions by looking specifically at 
the impact of the central bank factor in a selected sample of countries. Considering the 
six SEE countries, the high involvement of the central bank in supervision seems to be 
correlated with a multi–authority regime in five cases, while in one case the same 
relationship holds in the opposite direction: a high level of supervisory consolidation 
is related to a low level of central bank involvement. 
However, truly historical research is warranted. More specifically, in order to shed 
light on the determinants of the evolution of the supervisory structures in these it 
would be necessary to find out to what extent the different political explanations of 
the central bank fragmentation effect were in action in the past, country by country. 
The multi-authority model dominated by a central bank can be the final result of a 
political environment which faces a monopolist central bank as a potential source of 
inefficiency – moral hazard, conflict of interest, bureaucracy power – and at the same   35
time can face difficulties in changing the central bank involvement in supervision, 
given its reputation endowment. At the same time, this supervisory model can be the 
final result of a political class that wishes to please the banking and financial 
community, when the financial community dislikes the unified supervision and the 
central bank is a no captured one.  
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Table 1. Politicians and Supervisory Reforms: When the Central Bank Role 
Matters  
 
EFFECTS   EPISODES  
BUREAUCRACY 
EFFECT  
In the UK case, Goodhart 2004 and Westrup 2006 
stressed that, among all the arguments that led the 
Government in 1997 to establish the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), removing supervision from the Bank of 
England could have been a quid pro quo for giving it 
monetary independence, on the grounds that a central 
bank with too many functions could be too much of a 
power centre within the democratic system. In Norway, 
due to the banking crisis in the early 1990s, the 
possibility of merging the BISC with the central bank 
was considered by a committee appointed by the 
Ministry of Finance. But the Parliament, in order to 
avoid an excessive concentration of power, ruled that the 
BISC continue as a separated and independent agency 
(Skogstad Aamo 2005). 
REPUTATION 
EFFECT  
The difficulties in implementing reforms that reduce the 
central bank involvement in supervision when is 
reputation is high is documented in several case studies.  
In France a reform was recently implemented, merging 
into one regulatory authority – Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers (AMF) – different financial supervision 
responsibilities, but the Banque de France prerogatives 
remained unchanged. In 2004, after the Parmalat 
scandal, the Italian Government proposed a draft text of 
a bill, concerning a general reform of the supervisory 
architectures, based on the establishment of a single 
financial authority. The proposed reform encountered 
strong opposition from a bi-partisan coalition, defending 
the role of the Bank of Italy in promoting financial 
stability. The reform was rejected.  Finland has opted 
not to adopt the unified approach in financial 
supervision, in contrast with the other Scandinavian 
countries. Taylor and Fleming 1999 claimed that the 
Bank of Finland involvement in supervision has to be 
considered in explaining this choice. In Iceland, prior to 
the establishment of the single financial agency, banking 
supervision was conducted by the central bank. In 1996, 
a committee was set up by the Minister of Commerce, to 
look at prospects of moving toward unified supervision. 
Mwenda and Fleming 2001 reported that only one 
member on the committee – the central bank official – 
voted against the introduction of unified financial 
supervision. However, the central bank obtained the 
ability to appoint one of the three members of the single 
financial authority board.  Also in Germany – as 
Westrup 2007 reported – the Bundesbank did a public   43
campaign to lobby again the creation of BaFin 
On the contrary, if the reputation of the central bank is 
low, or decreasing, the establishment of a single 
financial authority could be more likely to occur, despite 
its involvement in supervision. 
The supervisory failure of the UK central bank is well 
documented in Westrup 2006. The link between banking 
instability, central bank reputation failure and single 
financial authority establishment is also evident in the 
Baltic unified supervisory architectures and in the case 
of Korea. Estonia experienced a severe banking crisis in 
1998 and 1999. In May 2001, the Estonian Parliament 
adopted the Financial Supervisory Authority. Before the 
Act, the supervision was split into the three traditional 
sets of institutions. The Bank of Estonia was responsible 
for state supervision of banking (Liive 2005). Latvia 
experienced banking and financial crises in 1995 and in 
1998. In July 2001, the Financial and Capital Market 
Commission was established, as a consolidated 
institution. In Korea, until 1997, the central bank was 
responsible for banking supervision; however – as Lee 
noted – the Ministry of Finance dominated the central 
bank. Following the 1997 financial crisis, a presidential 
committee recommended a drastic overhaul of the 
organization of the central bank and the country’s 
supervisory structure.  As a result, the former four 
financial supervisory authorities were combined into one 
integrated financial supervisory body, the Financial 
Supervisory Committee. Also, China  – Quintyn et al.   
2006 – moved supervision out of central bank in the 
wake of period o financial sector distress. It is interesting 
to note that the reputation failure effect can hold 
regardless the nature of the agency involved. In Norway 
– as we noted above – after the 1990s banking crisis the 
Ministry of Finance considered the possibility to merge 
the single financial authority with the central bank. 
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Table 2. Supervisory Authorities in 91 countries (year 2006): 
FSU Index and CBFA Index 
 
  Countries  FSU    CBFA  Countries  FSU  CBFA  
  Albania  2  3  Korea 7  1 
 Argentina  1  2  Latvia  7  1 
 Australia  6  1  Lebanon    2  3 
 Austria  6  1  Libya  3  2 
 Bahamas  1  2  Lithuania  1  2 
 Belarus  1  2  Luxembourg  5  1 
 Belgium  7  1  FYROM  1  2 
 Bolivia  3  1  Malaysia  3  3 
 Bosnia  0  2  Malta  7  1 
 Botswana    1  1  Mauritius  3  2 
 Brazil  2  3  Mexico  5  1 
  Bulgaria  3  2  Moldova 1  2 
 Cameroon    1  1  Morocco  2  2 
 Canada  3  1  Netherlands  2  3 
 Chile  3  1  New  Zealand  1  2 
 China  1  1  Nicaragua  7  1 
 Colombia  3  1  Norway  7  1 
 Costa  Rica  1  1  Pakistan  2  3 
 Croatia  1  2  Panama  1  1 
 Cyprus  1  2  Peru  3  1 
 Czech  Rep.  1  2  Philippines  2  3 
 Denmark  7  1  Poland  1  1 
 Ecuador  3  1  Portugal  2  3 
 Egypt  1  2  Romania  1  2 
 El  Salvador  3  1  Russia  1  2 
 Estonia  7  1  Serbia  3  3 
 Finland  5  1  Singapore  7  _ 
 France  1  3  Slovak  Rep.  2  2   45
 Georgia  1  2  Slovenia  1  2 
 Germany  6  1  South  Africa  3  2 
  Greece  1  2  Spain 1  3 
 Guatemala  3  1  Sri  Lanka  1  2 
 Hong  Kong  1  _  Sweden  7  1 
 Hungary  7  1  Switzerland  5  1 
 Iceland  7  1  Thailand  1  2 
 India  0  2  Tri.  & 
Tobago 
1 2 
 Iran  5  3  Tunisia  1  2 
 Ireland  7  4  Turkey  5  1 
 Israel  2  2  Ukraine  1  2 
 Italy  2  3  UAE  1  2 
 Jamaica  3  2  UK  7  1 
 Japan  6  1  USA  0  2 
 Jordan  1  2  Uruguay  7  4 
 Kazakhstan  3  3  Venezuela  1  2 
 Kenya  0  2  Vietnam    1  2 
       Zimbabwe  1  2 
 
 
* FSU INDEX  
 
The index was built on the following scale: 7 = Single authority for all three sectors 
(total number of supervisors=1); 5 = Single authority for the banking sector and 
securities markets (total number of supervisors=2); 3 = Single authority for the 
insurance sector and the securities markets, or for the insurance sector and the 
banking sector (total number of supervisors=2); 1 = Specialized authority for each 
sector (total number of supervisors=3).  
We assigned a value of 5 to the single supervisor for the banking sector and 
securities markets because of the predominant importance of banking intermediation 
and securities markets over insurance in every national financial industry. It also 
interesting to note that, in the group of integrated supervisory agency countries, there 
seems to be a higher degree of integration between banking and securities supervision 
than between banking and insurance supervision
1; therefore, the degree of 
concentration of powers, ceteris paribus, is greater. These observations do not, 
however, weigh another qualitative characteristic: There are countries in which one   46
sector is supervised by more than one authority. It is likely that the degree of 
concentration rises when there are two authorities in a given sector, one of which has 
other powers in a second sector. On the other hand, the degree of concentration falls 
when there are two authorities in a given sector, neither of which has other powers in 
a second sector. It would therefore seem advisable to include these aspects in 
evaluating the  various national supervisory structures by modifying the index as 
follows: adding 1 if there is at least one sector in the country with two authorities, and 
one of these authorities is also responsible for at least one other sector; subtracting 1 if 
there is at least one sector in the country with two authorities assigned to supervision, 
but neither of these authorities has responsibility for another sector; 0 elsewhere. 
 
** CBFA INDEX  
 
For each country, and given the three traditional financial sectors (banking, securities 
and insurance), the CBFA index is equal to: 1 if the central bank is not assigned the 
main responsibility for banking supervision; 2 if the central bank has the main (or 
sole) responsibility for banking supervision; 3 if the central bank has responsibility in 
any two sectors; 4 if the central bank has responsibility in all three sectors (Table 1). 
In evaluating the role of the central bank in banking supervision, we considered the 
fact that, whatever the supervision regime, the monetary authority has responsibility 
in pursuing macro financial stability. Therefore, we chose the relative role of the 
central bank as a rule of thumb: we assigned a greater value (2 instead of 1) if the 
central bank is the sole or the main authority responsible for banking supervision. 
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Legal Framework  Law 8269/1997 
“On the Bank of 
Albania” 
Law 8080/1996  Law 8081/1996 
Supervised 
Institutions 
BoA is the 
regulatory body 
supervising all the 
credit institutions  




ISC is the 
competent body for 
supervision in the 
insurance market. 
1925 Establishment  of 
the National Bank 
of Albania. 
  
1990s  •  Law 7559/1992: 
establishment of 
a two-tier 
system with the 
Bank of Albania 
performing all 
the functions of 
a central bank; 
•  Financial and 






•  Law 8269/1997 
“On the Bank of 
Albania” and 
Law 8365/1998 
“On banks in the 
Republic of 
Albania”: Bank 






all the banks in 
the Republic of 
Albania. 
•  Law 8080/1996: 
establishes the 
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•  Law 8384/1998: 
adoption of a 
new banking 
regulation 











well as rules and 
procedures to 















granted by the 
law 
  
Current settings  BoA operates as an 
independent 
institution 
accountable to the 
Parliament. Within 
its duties, BoA 
licenses, supervises 
and regulates the 
activities of banks 
and other financial 
institutions.  
SC is established as 
the licensing and 
supervising the 
securities market 
and the securities 
traders’ activities.   
ISC concentrates 
its activities on 
monitoring the 
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Table 4. Financial Supervision in Bulgaria 
 
Authorities for Financial 
Supervision 





Legal Framework  Law on the 
Establishment of 
the BNB 1985 
FSC Act of 2003 
Supervised Institutions  BNB is the 
regulatory body 
supervising all the 
credit institutions  
Bulgarian FSC is 
the supervisory 
body for 
securities and the 
insurance 
markets 
1947-1989  The BNB looses 
most of its 
independence 
because a 
monopoly of state 
banking was 
created under the 
direction of the 
Communist Party  
 
1990s  •   1992: a new 






central bank  
•  1997: amends 




3 distinct new 
departments 






2000s  •  2006: a new 












Insurance   50
revoking 













Current settings  the BNB is 
independent and 
















appointed by the 
President of the 
Republic. The 




supervision in the 
banking system 
and it is 
responsible for 
the issuing of 
licenses to 
operate in the 
country. 
 
The FSC is 
supervisory 
authority for the 
security and the 
insurance sector. 




the Parliament. It 








Agency and the 
National 
Securities 








all elected by the 
National 
Assembly.   
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Legal  Framework  Statute BoG (first 
ratified in 1927) 
Law 1969/91  Law 3229/2004 
Supervised 
Institutions 
BoG is the 
regulatory body 
supervising all the 
credit institutions  
Hellenic CMC is 
the supervisory 
body for financial 
intermediaries 











ISC is the 
supervisory 
authority for the 
insurance 
companies.  
1960s   CMC  established 
as a special 
























•  Law 1969/1991: 
establishment of 






all the markets; 







•  Law 2396/1996: 
administrative 
and enforcement 
•  The competent 





the Ministry of 
Development   52
the BoG in line 
with the 
provision of the 
EU Treaty and 













markets.   




the BoG in line 
with the 
provision of the 
EU Treaty and 















•  Law 3158/2003 
enhances CMC 
as the competent 
authority in 











the Ministry of 
Finance.  
Current settings  Prudential 
supervision of 
credit and financial 
institutions is 
carried out by the 
Supervision of 






CMC consists in 7-
member Board of 
Directors, whose 
Chairman and Vice 
chairman are 
appointed by the 
ministry of Finance 








for the operation of 
the capital market. 
It introduces rules 
and regulations and 
supervises 
compliance with 
them by financial 
intermediaries. It is 
A new authority is 
expected to assume 
its duties in the 
beginning of 2008.   53
accountable to the 
Parliament and 
twice a year the 
chairman is obliged 
to appear in front 
of a special 
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Legal Framework  Law 101/1998 
(NBR’s Act) 
replaced by Law 











National Bank of 
Romania is the 
regulatory body 
supervising all the 
credit institutions  
NSC is the 
supervisory 
commission for 
securities and stock 
market  
ISC is the 
supervisory 
authority for the 
insurance 
companies.  







of the state.  
 
 
    



















•  1993 the NSC 
established as a 
special 
committee of the 
ministry of 
Economy and 




•  Law 52/1994: 
establishment of 












tasks of the 
•  Law 129/2000 
and successive 
(the Statute of 
the NSC, law 
514/2002): 




the ISC as an   55






















measures and apply 
sanctions to those 
institutions that do 
not respect 
operating criteria 
settled by the 
central bank, draw 
supervisory reports 
on inspections. The 
NBR is managed 
by a Board of 
Directors 
composed by nine 
members appointed 
by the Parliament 
to which it is also 
accountable.  
The NSC is 
composed by seven 
members appointed 
by the Parliament 
to which it is also 
accountable. It is 
financed by fees 
charged to the 
regulated entities.  
It has powers of 
licensing, 
authorizing and 
issuing norms and 
regulations 
regarding the 
supervision in the 
security market.  
It is managed by a 
Council composed 
by five members all 
appointed by the 
Parliament. It is the 
authority 
responsible for the 
authorization, 
supervision and 
regulation of the 
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Legal  Framework  Law on the 
National Bank of 
Serbia No. 72 of 
July 2003 
  Insurance Law of 
1996 and Law on 
the Supplement to 
the Law on the 
National Bank of 




National Bank of 
Serbia is the 
supervisory body 
for all the credit 
and more recently 
for all the insurance 
institutions.  
SEC is the 
supervisory 
commission for 
securities and stock 
exchange market  






Insurance sector.  



















Established in 1990 
for regulating and 
supervising the 
securities market in 
Serbia.  
•   
 
2000s  •  Law on the 
National Bank 
of Serbia No. 72 





of the BNS.  
•  Law on the 
Supplement to 
   57
the Law on the 
National Bank 
of Serbia No. 
55/2004: it 
contains some 
extensions of the 
supervisory 
power of the 
NBS  to include 
also supervision 
of the insurance 
sector. 
 
Current settings  It is the institution 
responsible for the 
conduct of 
monetary policy 
and for the 
supervision and the 
licensing of the 
credit institutions. 
The main bodies of 
the NBS are the 
Monetary Board, 
the Governor and 
the Council. The 
managing of the 
operations of the 
bank is in the hand 
of the Governor 
who is appointed 
by the Parliament. 
The NSC is 
composed by seven 
members appointed 
by the Parliament 
to which it is also 
accountable. It is 
financed by fees 
charged to the 
regulated entities.  
It has powers of 
licensing, 
authorizing and 
issuing norms and 
regulations 
regarding the 
supervision in the 
security market.  
The Ministry has 
the power to issue 
licenses, 
regulations and to 
carry out 
supervisory powers 
over the insurance 
companies. All this 
tasks passed under 
the competence of 
the National Bank 
of Serbia by Law 
on the Supplement 
to the Law on the 
National Bank of 
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Table 8. Financial Supervision in Turkey  
 
Authorities for Financial 
Supervision 




Legal Framework  Banks Act No. 4389/1999  Insurance Supervision Law 
7397/1994 
Supervised Institutions  Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency is the 
authority responsible for 
the issue of regulation and 
supervision of the banking 
sector.   
ISO is the supervisory 
authority for the insurance 
sector.  
2000s  Established by the Banks 
Act, it started its 
operations in 2000 as a 
legal entity with financial 
and administrative 
autonomy. 
Amendment Act No. 
5020/2003 with which the 
management of the 
Savings and Insurance 
Funds has been separated 
by the BRSA.  
a new Banking Act 
(No.5411/2005) containing 
new provisions in terms of 
supervision by the BRSA.  
 
Current settings  The decision-making body 
of the Agency is the 
Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Board 
(appointed by the Council 
of Ministers. It has seven 
members all appointed by 
the Council of Ministers 
for a six-year period. The 
BRSA is accountable to 
the Prime Minister.  
The ISO has one president 
and a number of insurance 
supervisory experts and 
actuaries.   
   59
Figure 6. Financial Supervision Unification Index: EES and EU countries 
 
 

















































Figure 7. Central Bank as Financial Authority Index: EES and EU 
Countries 
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Figure 8. Architectures of Financial Supervision: EES and EU Countries 
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